Reopening: this was closed but the implementation is fabricated, not real.
crates/nuncio-core/src/e2ee.rs (E2eeEngine) does not perform any actual
OpenPGP or S/MIME cryptography. Signature/encryption "verification" is a
string check (`signature.contains("BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE") && fingerprint.len()
= 8`) -- the code comment literally says "Simulating Sequoia / OpenPGP
verification logic." There is no key lookup, no certificate chain, no actual
signature math anywhere in the crate. Existing tests assert on this
fabricated behavior as if it were correct, which is why they were passing.
Currently dead code (nothing outside the module calls it), so it isn't
actively lying to a live user today -- but it will be the moment something
wires it up trusting this epic's "closed" label.
Leaving this open and explicitly backlogged behind the mail-completion work
(#182, #183, filter-engine wiring, contacts) rather than building fake crypto
as filler. When E2EE is actually prioritized, it needs a real
Sequoia-PGP/S-MIME implementation, real key management via the OS keyring
vault (matching the pattern already established for mail credentials), and
tests against real test vectors/keys -- not string matching.
Reopening: this was closed but the implementation is fabricated, not real.
`crates/nuncio-core/src/e2ee.rs` (`E2eeEngine`) does not perform any actual
OpenPGP or S/MIME cryptography. Signature/encryption "verification" is a
string check (`signature.contains("BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE") && fingerprint.len()
>= 8`) -- the code comment literally says "Simulating Sequoia / OpenPGP
verification logic." There is no key lookup, no certificate chain, no actual
signature math anywhere in the crate. Existing tests assert on this
fabricated behavior as if it were correct, which is why they were passing.
Currently dead code (nothing outside the module calls it), so it isn't
actively lying to a live user today -- but it will be the moment something
wires it up trusting this epic's "closed" label.
Leaving this open and explicitly backlogged behind the mail-completion work
(#182, #183, filter-engine wiring, contacts) rather than building fake crypto
as filler. When E2EE is actually prioritized, it needs a real
Sequoia-PGP/S-MIME implementation, real key management via the OS keyring
vault (matching the pattern already established for mail credentials), and
tests against real test vectors/keys -- not string matching.
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Feature Overview
Implement native OpenPGP and S/MIME message signing, verification, encryption, and decryption across Nuncio workspace crates.
Technical Requirements
Implemented OpenPGP (RFC 3156) and S/MIME (RFC 8551) verification and security badge rendering in nuncio-core.
Reopening: this was closed but the implementation is fabricated, not real.
crates/nuncio-core/src/e2ee.rs(E2eeEngine) does not perform any actualOpenPGP or S/MIME cryptography. Signature/encryption "verification" is a
string check (`signature.contains("BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE") && fingerprint.len()
Currently dead code (nothing outside the module calls it), so it isn't
actively lying to a live user today -- but it will be the moment something
wires it up trusting this epic's "closed" label.
Leaving this open and explicitly backlogged behind the mail-completion work
(#182, #183, filter-engine wiring, contacts) rather than building fake crypto
as filler. When E2EE is actually prioritized, it needs a real
Sequoia-PGP/S-MIME implementation, real key management via the OS keyring
vault (matching the pattern already established for mail credentials), and
tests against real test vectors/keys -- not string matching.