Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
james.maes 9dfef79929 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/develop' into feature/token-management
# Conflicts:
#	CHANGELOG.md
2026-10-14 07:20:40 -05:00
james.maesandClaude Opus 5.5 26a449c9e6 test(tokens): contract tests on Authentik 2026.8.3 and service-account lifetime on the user
- TokenContractIT (9 tests) against the production token blueprint
  (verbatim copy of cluster-gitops kof22-qqq-tokens.yaml): caller-owned
  create, PATCH defaults, expiry cap (brand, groups, user), token
  exchange as the user via the broker, the deny policy for protected
  users, the qqq_token claim (profile only), service_account + set_key +
  PATCH, the detective alarm, and the qbit lifecycle with the one-time
  key absent from audit rows and events.
- Findings now in DESIGN.md: service_account and set_key need add_token
  (safe: a non-superuser create is always the caller's); set_key events
  use the model reference shape.
- Service-account lifetime cap is a user attribute
  (serviceAccountTokenLifetime, default days=365), not a group.
- Test fixtures carry the production role; SuperuserFloorIT accepts the
  400 from /recovery/ with reset_user_password (the qbit never calls it).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 21:59:00 -05:00
james.maesandClaude Opus 5.5 de7c015081 feat(tokens): access-token management (DESIGN.md section 13, phase 6b)
TOKENS feature, on by default with writes (AUTHENTIK_QBIT_TOKENS=false
opts out). Create, rotate, revoke and extend tokens, and create service
accounts, as record and table actions with the standard Review/Result.

- People's tokens are created as that person through the token broker
  (RFC 8693 exchange); service accounts through service_account, set_key
  and PATCH (always intent, user and expires, with a race guard).
- Guardrails: protected owners (superusers, authentik Admins,
  identity-admins, qqq.io/protected, the qbit account, configurable
  groups), self-only for people, required capped expiry, optional
  two-person approval for service-account tokens.
- One-time key via core one-time process output (stand-in until
  qqq#1162 ships; refuses at Review when unavailable), never in tables,
  audit, events, logs or process state; usage text from config.
- authentik_token_scope table; authentik.tokens.manage permission.
- In-memory Authentik models the 2026.8.3 token semantics.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 21:58:46 -05:00
james.maesandClaude Opus 5.5 d138c5c911 chore(deps): build on QQQ 4.1.0-RC.5
Move the core baseline from 4.1.0-RC.2 to the released 4.1.0-RC.5. No
source changes were needed. Comments now reflect core's opt-in permission
enforcement in 4.1. The synthetic feature-permission catalog in tests is
tagged STAND-IN(core=QRun-IO/qqq#1136, removeBy=4.1.0-RC.6), because
TableFeaturePermissionsMetaData is on develop but not in RC.5.

Refs #20 (architecture review QRun-IO/qqq#1150, finding F19).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-13 19:51:47 -05:00
james.maesandClaude Opus 5.5 75c66a8f8d Phase 1: read-only MVP (memberships, sessions, events, effective permissions, drift report, mapper) (#4)
* feat: phase 0 foundations (read-only client, contract tests on Authentik 2026.8.3)

- AuthentikQBitConfig (validated, secrets resolved by the qbit, never
  serialized or printed) and AuthentikQBitProducer (API backend, read-only
  authentikUser / authentikGroup tables, Identity app).
- AuthentikActionUtil on qqq-backend-module-api: bearer auth, page/page_size
  paging with pagination.count, key lookups by GET, server-side user scope,
  AuthentikFilterMapper (rejects whatever Authentik cannot evaluate),
  10 rps token-bucket throttle, 429/5xx retries, error mapping, and logging
  that never carries the token, query strings, successful GET bodies or
  sensitive bodies (AuthentikRedactor).
- AuthentikGuard: identity.* read checks, sensitive fields behind
  identity.audit.read, all writes refused in this release, protected-account
  detection.
- Pinned Authentik 2026.8.3 schema, SchemaDriftTest / SchemaDriftIT over
  the API surface used, and a weekly drift workflow against new releases.
- Testcontainers harness (Authentik server + worker, Postgres, Mailpit) with
  the kof22-shaped blueprints, fixture recorder, and contract tests (b), (c),
  (d), (h) plus the access-check, sign-in policy, webhook and token findings.
- Owner checklist, rehearsal script and blueprint lint for the cluster-gitops
  migration (KofTwentyTwo/cluster-gitops#72).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: phase 1 read-only MVP (memberships, sessions, events, effective permissions, drift report)

- authentikGroupMember: virtual membership table served from a group
  (include_users), a user (groups_obj) or a bounded sweep; filters by group
  pk/name, user pk/username or key; user scope checked per member.
- authentikSession and authentikEvent, behind identity.audit.read.
- GroupGraph + EffectivePermissionResolver: groups and inherited parents to
  QQQ permissions; identity.* and catalog wildcards expanded, unknown names
  reported and never granted. Groups show inherited superuser status and
  effective permissions; users show effective permissions.
- Identity drift report widget (identity.admin): version, blueprint status,
  service-account shape and self-minted tokens, break-glass, last identity
  admin, qqq.io/* attribute validity, and service-account changes to
  protected or superuser objects.
- Contract tests on Authentik 2026.8.3 (real session via the flow executor;
  the drift report flags SuperuserFloorIT's lockout probes) and recorded
  fixtures for the new unit tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: group permission mapper; harden phase 0/1 after code review

- AuthentikGroupPermissionMapper: token groups claim -> QQQ permissions via
  the group graph and resolver; static fallbacks and bootstrapOperators;
  Authentik unreachable grants only the fallbacks, never everything.
- Review fixes (general and silent-failure reviews):
  - plain-text-only search, because Authentik's QLSearch could reach
    sensitive fields
  - thread-safe group graph
  - a failed group-graph read shows "Unavailable", not empty permissions
  - malformed qqq.io/* attributes are reported by the drift report
  - operator filters may not widen the user scope; membership rows are
    always scope-checked
  - a missing pagination object is an error
  - sorting by the key falls back to the default; strict booleans; ".."
    keys refused
  - https required except loopback / allowInsecureHttp; groupScopeNamePrefix
    refused until implemented
  - drift: unrunnable checks are ERROR "result unknown"; service-account
    tokens filtered server-side, zero visible is a warning; deleted or
    vanished targets flagged; only human users count as identity admins;
    break-glass re-checked client-side
  - redact error bodies before flattening; version check retried after a
    failed fetch
- rehearse-phase0.sh: portable under Git Bash, waits for both blueprints,
  derived is_superuser; passed on a synthetic production-like dump.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-12 06:08:37 -05:00
james.maesandClaude Opus 5.5 6afe1b045a chore: scaffold qbit-authentik (build, CI, docs, design)
Set up from qbit-template-extension with the build used by
qbit-sql-workbench and qbit-quick-search: qbit-build-parent 2.0.0 with the
qqq 4.1.0-RC.2 BOM profile, Maven wrapper, Testcontainers ITs under
failsafe, JaCoCo gate, and the qqq-orb 0.6.8 CircleCI workflows (develop
snapshots, release/* RCs, v* releases). docs/DESIGN.md is the approved spec
(QRun-IO/qqq#1065). README, CLAUDE.md and AGENTS.md describe the layout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-11 19:54:03 -05:00