The table customizer finds the stored row of an update by its id, and
compared the two ids as they came: the id of a request over HTTP is text
(it is the id in the path), the stored id is a number. They were never
equal, so an edit made through the API or the UI had no stored row and was
validated and stamped as an insert. The uniqueness check of a
classification compared ids the same way. Both now compare the ids as text.
This is older than the standard dates, but they build on it: the customizer
gives a new row its create date, and a client that knows record versions
edits a table with a modify date by sending only the changed values and the
version it read.
What an edit over HTTP did before:
- A classification, policy or retention rule got a new create_date.
- Releasing a legal hold overwrote when and by whom it was placed (and,
since the hold has one, its create date).
- Editing the reason of a legal hold without sending its status failed with
a server error (the validation read the status of a row it did not have).
- Editing a classification while naming its table and field was refused as
a second classification of that field.
- Editing a retention rule without sending every field was refused.
Tests (SecuredDataHttpEditTest, through the real middleware on the shipped
schema, a day after the rows were written): the reason of a hold is edited
with the changed value and the version, and the stale version is then
refused; a hold is released and keeps when and by whom it was placed and
its create date; a classification is edited naming its table and field; a
policy and a retention rule are renamed and keep their create dates; a row
with neither date is read and edited. All five fail without the fix. They
run in UTC: where the default zone of the JVM is not UTC, core refuses
every update that sends a version, which is core's to fix and is kept out
of these tests.
Notes for an upgrade (shipped DDL block and README): set a lock_timeout
before the ALTER statements and run the block again when one is cancelled;
on a large access log run its backfill UPDATE in ranges of id, or leave it
out, since rows without the two dates are read and written like any
others. Changelog: the fix, that an update naming the create date still
sets it, and that a wipe moves the record version of its retention rule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every table of the QBit has a create date and a modify date: DATE_TIME, not
editable, with core's CREATE_DATE and MODIFY_DATE behaviors, in the columns
create_date and modify_date.
Seven tables did not have them: reveal grant, break-glass session, access
log, wipe run, wipe marker, legal hold and audit key. Their fields are named
createDate and modifyDate. Classification, policy and retention rule already
had create_date and modify_date, set by the table customizer. They keep those
field names, because a rename would change what a host reads and what their
audits record, and the two fields are now not editable and have the
behaviors.
Writes. Every write of the QBit is a core insert or update action, so the
dates are in the statement that writes the row. The table customizer sets
them, as it did for the three tables: a new row gets both, equal, from the
QBit's clock, and a changed row a new modify date. The access-log writer
still runs one insert per row and no other statement, lock or transaction.
The access log and wipe runs are only ever inserted, so their dates stay
equal.
Core uses a DATE_TIME field with the MODIFY_DATE behavior as the record
version of its table. That now holds for all ten tables: on an update core
sets the modify date itself, after the customizer has run, and an update
that sends the version it read is refused when the row has changed since.
Updates that send no version, the QBit's own among them, behave as before.
Schema. docs/ddl/secured-data-postgres.sql has a new last block that adds
the two columns to the seven tables: nullable, defaulting to the current
time, with the rows that were already there given the row's own time. No
CREATE TABLE statement is edited. An existing database runs that block
alone, before this release is deployed. The block rewrites no table, can be
run while the release before this one is running (its inserts name neither
column and get both from the default) and can be run again. This release
does not run without the columns. README: "Upgrading an existing database".
Unchanged. The dates have no classification, policy or assistant exposure of
their own: they are CONFIDENTIAL with their table and get the tier of its
other fields. Nothing signed or verified covers them: a wrapped data key is
bound to its table, field and record id, and the fingerprints of a log row
are made from search values. A changed policy or classification writes the
same core audit, field by field, and the same POLICY_CHANGE or
CLASSIFICATION_CHANGE row.
Tests. SecuredDataStandardDatesTest: every table the producer declares has
the two dates (the tables are taken from the instance, so a table added
later without them fails); the dates resolve to the tier of the other fields
of their table for five kinds of session; every writer sets both and only a
change moves the modify date (access-log writer, policy, classification,
legal hold, reveal, break-glass start, end and expiry on the memory backend;
audit key, wipe run, wipe marker and retention rule in the shipped schema);
the access-log writer runs exactly one insert per row; a changed policy and
classification write the audit and log rows they wrote before; rows written
before the columns existed are unchanged by the upgrade block, their wrapped
keys unwrap to the same data keys and their audit token verifies the same
value and no other. SecuredDataDdlTest: the shipped DDL gives every declared
table the two columns, the upgrade block adds them where they were missing,
an insert that names neither succeeds, and the block can be run twice. Seven
of the eight new tests fail without the change; the eighth is the record of
what a changed policy wrote before and passes on both sides.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moves the pin to QQQ 4.1.0-RC.6 and removes the stand-ins RC.6 provides
(classification, client channels, table features, the UI API extension
point). Adds retention rules, wipe markers, legal holds, wipe runs and the
per-record-per-field audit key table; the wipe process (null with marker,
overwrite, keyed hash, delete, archive then wipe) runs in one transaction
per batch, destroying the audit keys with the field updates; the audit
protector and key source (AES-GCM wrapped DEKs, AAD-bound); the backups
warning; canary and wipe-proof tests.
Fixes a key-source bug that zeroed each DEK after returning it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
One Secured Data home: KPIs, recent reveals, top revealers and reasons,
break-glass events, policy and classification changes and anomaly flags,
as full-width tables. Anomaly rules (3x daily median, distinct records per
hour, exact-match volume, break-glass) raise secured_data.anomaly and flag
the log row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reveal service (options, reason validation, daily cap, grants, audit),
break-glass start/end/expiry with alerts and admin notification, status,
the secured-data 1.0.0 UI API extension (compiled under the uiapi profile
until RC.6) and a contingent field picker for classification rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tables secured_data_classification, _policy, _reveal_grant, _break_glass
and _access_log; SecuredDataClassifications; the tier resolver with
break-glass, table features, policy rows, channel caps and code defaults;
the asynchronous access log; enumeration guardrails (rate limit, miss and
distinct-value alerts, minimum entropy). Builds on QQQ RC.5 with marked
stand-ins for the unreleased fieldaccess API and a reflective bridge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>