docs(bus): scrub JarvisBusWorld drift + add grep gate (#45 )

`fb41c5f` (2026-05-02) unified `Injection.js` and the HUD bundle into the default `WKContentWorld.page` and retired the prior isolated `JarvisBusWorld` named world. The doc-comments and test fixtures across 20+ lines kept describing the bug-era topology — pre-existing-bus attach "because cross-world isolation", message-handler-only-visible-in-named- world, etc. — for months afterward. Result: a new reader following the docs would conclude the bus uses two worlds when it actually uses one. Five rationale rewrites: - `WebviewBridge.swift` class doc — handler is on the page world, not an isolated named world. Page scripts in the loaded HUD bundle address it via `window.webkit.messageHandlers.jarvisBus`. - `Injection.js` header — names the page world explicitly; one-line nod to `fb41c5f` for the historical context. - `bridge.ts` JSDoc + `isJarvisBusShape` rationale — recast the H-02 attach-to-existing path as a "defensive double-install guard" inside ONE page world. Injection.js fires first at document-start; the bundle installer fires later as a top-level `main.tsx` side-effect; the guard prevents the bundle from clobbering Injection.js's queued early messages and captured handshake state. The duck-type `isJarvisBusShape` CODE is unchanged — only the comment narrative was misleading. - `webview/packages/hud/src/main.tsx` — drop the cross-world-isolation framing; describe the single-world reality. - `App/AppDelegate.swift` install comment — page world, not isolated. Test-side updates (same scrub, plus one latent test bug surfaced): - `WebviewBridgeTests.test_scriptMessageHandlerIsRegisteredUnderConfigured- Name`: was removing from `WKContentWorld.world(name: "JarvisBusWorld")` while the bridge registered against `.page` — silent no-op since `removeScriptMessageHandler` doesn't throw on absent. Now removes from `.page` (the world the bridge actually uses), making the "registration-is-evidence-of-success" assertion meaningful again. - `WebviewBridgeOutboundTests`: comment-only. - `RealWKWebViewIntegrationTests`: comment-only (forensic narrative kept, literal world name replaced with "prior isolated named content world"). - `webview/packages/bus/tests/bridge.test.ts`: H-02 describe-block + one it-name rewritten to match the new defensive-double-install rationale. Infrastructure: - `scripts/check-no-jarvis-bus-world-references.sh`: new boundary gate. Greps for the literal `JarvisBusWorld` in tracked files; excludes `.planning/`, `docs/`, `webview/packages/*/dist/`, and this script itself. Wired into `CLAUDE.md`'s gate listing; the CI `boundary-gates` job auto-discovers all `scripts/check-*.sh`, so no workflow edit is needed. - `webview/packages/bus/package.json`: 0.0.0 → 0.0.1 (per spec — comment-only changes still bump patch so consumers can pin). - `webview/packages/bus/dist/bridge.{js,d.ts}`: rebuilt via `pnpm --filter @jarvis/bus build`; NOT committed because `dist/` is not tracked (the build phase regenerates on each xcodebuild invocation). Verified locally: - `swift build --package-path packages/Bus` clean - `pnpm --filter @jarvis/bus test` — 37/37 pass - `bash scripts/check-no-jarvis-bus-world-references.sh` — PASS - `bash scripts/check-bus-protocol-version.sh` — PASS (v2.3.0) - `bash scripts/check-bus-harness-parity.sh` — PASS Closes #45 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs(memory): scrub Phase-7 hedge language from MemoryStore (#19 )
2026-05-14 09:27:31 -05:00 · 2026-05-14 09:11:52 -05:00
12 changed files with 97 additions and 1467 deletions
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-# OpenSSF Scorecard — security supply-chain posture for KofTwentyTwo/Jarvis.
-#
-# Issue #178. Scorecard scores 18 security checks (Branch-Protection, Code-Review,
-# Pinned-Dependencies, SAST, Token-Permissions, etc.) and publishes results as
-# SARIF to GitHub code-scanning. A weekly schedule keeps the score fresh; we
-# also re-run on every push to develop so significant posture regressions show
-# up promptly. The badge in README.md links back to the public scorecard page.
-#
-# Permissions are the canonical Scorecard set:
-#   - id-token: write          OIDC for publish-results
-#   - contents: read           read repo tree
-#   - security-events: write   upload SARIF to code-scanning
-#
-# This workflow runs on github-hosted ubuntu-latest. Self-hosted Grogu is not
-# used here -- Scorecard is short, network-bound, and benefits from a clean
-# ephemeral environment.
-#
-# Workflow consumes no untrusted user inputs (no github.event.* interpolation
-# in run: blocks), so it is safe from workflow-injection patterns.
-
-name: OpenSSF Scorecard
-
-on:
-  schedule:
-    # Mondays at 06:00 UTC. Off-peak relative to weekday push spikes.
-    - cron: "0 6 * * 1"
-  push:
-    branches: [develop]
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-permissions: read-all
-
-jobs:
-  analysis:
-    name: Scorecard analysis
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      id-token: write
-      contents: read
-      security-events: write
-
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      - name: Run Scorecard
-        uses: ossf/scorecard-action@v2.4.0
-        with:
-          results_file: results.sarif
-          results_format: sarif
-          # publish_results: true uploads anonymized scores to the OpenSSF
-          # public dataset, which is what powers the README badge URL
-          # (api.scorecard.dev). Safe for a public repo; would need
-          # reconsidering if the repo were ever made private.
-          publish_results: true
-
-      - name: Upload SARIF to code-scanning
-        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
-        with:
-          sarif_file: results.sarif
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
 [![Issues](https://img.shields.io/github/issues/KofTwentyTwo/Jarvis)](https://github.com/KofTwentyTwo/Jarvis/issues)
 [![Platform: macOS 26](https://img.shields.io/badge/platform-macOS%2026%20Tahoe-blue)](https://www.apple.com/macos/)
 [![Swift 6](https://img.shields.io/badge/swift-6.0-orange)](https://swift.org)
-[![OpenSSF Scorecard](https://api.scorecard.dev/projects/github.com/KofTwentyTwo/Jarvis/badge)](https://scorecard.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/KofTwentyTwo/Jarvis)

 Jarvis is a hybrid native + embedded-web macOS app that runs as an ambient
 menu-bar presence. A Swift host owns the operating system (mic, camera,
@@ -54,7 +53,46 @@ view, the Bus is the only legal way they talk. Subsystems live in
 single-purpose SPM packages; **18 boundary-gate scripts** keep the
 isolation honest.

-![Jarvis 2-Process Architecture Topology](docs/architecture.png)
+```mermaid
+flowchart TB
+    User[User<br/>voice / text / hotkey]
+
+    subgraph Swift["Swift host (AppKit + SwiftUI)"]
+        AppDel[AppDelegate<br/>install DAG + lifecycle]
+        Orch[AgentOrchestrator<br/>tool-loop + streaming]
+        Bridge[WebviewBridge<br/>typed JSON Bus]
+        Voice[Voice<br/>wake / STT / TTS]
+        Vision[Vision<br/>camera + frame-attach]
+        Memory[Memory<br/>SQLite + vec + mem0]
+        MCP[MCPRuntime<br/>helpers + in-proc tools]
+        Replay[Replay<br/>turn-by-turn audit log]
+        Boot[BootHealth<br/>NOT FAKED probes]
+    end
+
+    LLM["LLMProvider<br/>Anthropic Opus 4.7 / Ollama"]
+
+    subgraph Web["WKWebView (React + R3F)"]
+        Ring[Particle ring]
+        Chat[Chat panel]
+        DevOv[Dev Overlay]
+    end
+
+    User --> Voice
+    User --> Bridge
+    AppDel --> Vision
+    AppDel --> Orch
+    AppDel --> Voice
+    AppDel --> Boot
+    Voice --> Orch
+    Orch <--> LLM
+    Orch --> MCP
+    Orch --> Memory
+    Orch --> Vision
+    Orch --> Replay
+    Orch --> Bridge
+    Boot --> Bridge
+    Bridge <-->|Bus protocol| Web
+```

 The deep architecture doc is [`ARCHITECTURE.md`](ARCHITECTURE.md) (subsystem
 deep-dives, anti-patterns, navigation cheat sheet). The v1.0 typed-API
@@ -97,7 +135,21 @@ asserts the spawn-line ordering AND that `voiceInstallTask` awaits
 `agentInstallTask?.value` (a strictly stronger guarantee than spawn-order
 alone).

-![Jarvis Install Order Sequence](docs/install_order.png)
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    Boot([applicationWillFinishLaunching]) --> Vision[installVision]
+    Boot --> Memory[installMemory]
+    Boot --> MCP[installMCP]
+    Boot --> Replay[installReplay]
+    Vision --> Agent[installAgent]
+    Memory --> Agent
+    MCP --> Agent
+    Replay --> Agent
+    Agent --> Voice[installVoice]
+    Voice --> Probes[registerBootHealthProbes]
+    Probes --> Bridge[Webview handshake]
+    Bridge --> Ready([HUD ready])
+```

 ## Build & run

@@ -163,7 +215,21 @@ subscribers that need it. If a subsystem is degraded, the orchestrator
 **injects a system-prompt preamble** so the agent doesn't promise to
 remember things the memory store can't actually persist.

-![Jarvis Agent Turn Lifecycle](docs/turn_lifecycle.png)
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    In[User input<br/>text / voice transcript] --> Orch[AgentOrchestrator]
+    Health[BootHealth.rollup] -->|degradation preamble| Orch
+    Orch --> Provider[LLMProvider.stream]
+    Provider --> Events[(streaming events<br/>token / thinking / tool-use / stop)]
+    Events --> Bcast[Broadcaster<br/>single consumer]
+    Bcast --> Tx[Transcript]
+    Bcast --> Mem[Memory extractor]
+    Bcast --> Dev[DevOverlay]
+    Bcast --> Voice[Voice / TTS]
+    Bcast --> Bus[WebviewBridge → HUD]
+    Orch --> Tools[MCP tool calls]
+    Tools --> Provider
+```

 ## Boot-health probes

@@ -174,7 +240,32 @@ failures turn the menu-bar icon **red**, raise a non-dismissible HUD
 banner, and inject the degradation preamble into the agent's system
 prompt.

-![Jarvis Boot-Health Probe Ladder](docs/boot_health.png)
+```mermaid
+flowchart LR
+    M[MemoryBootHealthProbe<br/>vec0 + FTS5 reachable]
+    A[AnthropicBootHealthProbe<br/>keychain has API key]
+    O[OllamaBootHealthProbe<br/>service reachable + model loaded]
+    Vc[VoiceBootHealthProbe<br/>audio graph alive]
+    Vi[VisionBootHealthProbe<br/>AVCapture authorized]
+    Mc[MCPBootHealthProbe<br/>helper apps + in-proc tools]
+    R[ReplayBootHealthProbe<br/>WAL writable]
+    W[WebviewBootHealthProbe<br/>handshake completed]
+    Roll[BootHealthOrchestrator.rollup]
+    Icon[Menu-bar icon<br/>red on critical]
+    Banner[Non-dismissible banner]
+    Pre[Agent system-prompt<br/>degradation preamble]
+    M --> Roll
+    A --> Roll
+    O --> Roll
+    Vc --> Roll
+    Vi --> Roll
+    Mc --> Roll
+    R --> Roll
+    W --> Roll
+    Roll --> Icon
+    Roll --> Banner
+    Roll --> Pre
+```

 ## Project culture

@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
-# Local-first LLM routing — design
-
-**Status:** draft 2026-05-14, awaiting user approval
-**Authors:** James + Claude (Opus 4.7)
-**Scope:** flip the chat-turn provider default from Anthropic to local Ollama, with reactive escalation to Claude Opus on detectable Ollama failure.
-
-## Goal
-
-Default every conversation turn to local Ollama (`qwen2.5-coder:32b-instruct-q8_0`). Escalate to Anthropic Claude Opus 4.7 only when local fails in a way the runtime can detect. The user sees one coherent reply per turn, with a small badge if escalation fired.
-
-## Why now
-
-The codebase is already structurally ready:
-
- `LLMProvider` protocol is symmetric between Anthropic + Ollama (same `AsyncThrowingStream<LLMEvent>` shape, same `ToolChoice.none` semantics).
- `AgentOrchestrator` is already config-driven via `providerFactory(perTurn.resolvedProvider)` (line 311).
- A mid-conversation escalation hook already exists — line 793 retries on `streamTruncated` by calling `providerFactory(updated.resolvedProvider)`.
- Memory extraction is wired to Ollama separately and is not affected by chat-turn routing.
-
-This is mostly a policy + UX change, not a new abstraction.
-
-## Approach
-
-Reactive fallback only. No predictive routing, no router-model classifier, no self-reported escalation tool. The orchestrator tries Ollama first; if it fails in one of an enumerated set of detectable ways, it retries the turn once on Anthropic, emits an escalation event for the HUD, and surfaces the answer to the user.
-
-User picked this approach because:
-
-1. The existing escalation hook is reactive — extending what's there beats inventing a new layer.
-2. Reactive fallback produces evidence — every escalation is a real-world data point for any future predictive routing.
-3. Zero added latency on the happy path; no extra LLM call to classify the turn.
-
-## Spec
-
-### 1. Default provider flip
-
- `default-config.json:9` changes from `"anthropic"` to `"ollama"`.
- `PerTurnSnapshot.provider` already exists as the policy carrier.
- Ollama target model is `qwen2.5-coder:32b-instruct-q8_0` (the tool-calling baseline pinned by `ModelID.qwen25coder32b`).
- Anthropic remains a first-class provider and remains selectable.
-
-### 2. Escalation trigger taxonomy
-
-The runtime fires escalation on, and only on, these detectable failure modes (closed enum `OllamaFailureKind`):
-
-| Trigger | Detection |
-|---|---|
-| `streamTruncated` | Existing — already wired at `AgentOrchestrator.swift:793`. |
-| `malformedToolCall` | `tool_calls` payload fails to decode against `ToolUseRequest`. Known Qwen 3.x footgun per CLAUDE.md. |
-| `unknownTool` | Model invokes a tool name not in the registry. |
-| `refusal` | `stopReason: .refusal` event arrives. |
-| `connectionFailure` | URLSession error before any tokens received (Ollama down, port refused). |
-| `emptyResponse` | `messageStop` with zero `textDelta` and zero `toolUseRequested`. |
-
-Explicit non-triggers (do not escalate):
-
- Partial answer that "feels weak"
- Semantic hallucinations the runtime can't detect
- Tool that returned an error (tool failure ≠ model failure)
- Slow streaming (no SLA-based escalation)
-
-These are quality problems the runtime cannot judge. Out of scope for this design.
-
-### 3. Escalation contract
-
-```swift
-struct EscalationDecision: Sendable, Codable {
-    let from: ProviderSelection           // .ollama
-    let to: ProviderSelection             // .anthropic
-    let reason: OllamaFailureKind
-    let firedAt: Date
-}
-```
-
-`AgentOrchestrator` enforces **at most one escalation per turn**. If the post-escalation Anthropic call also fails, the orchestrator surfaces the error to the user — it does not fall back further. (A second failure means the cloud provider is also down; pretending otherwise is dishonest.)
-
-### 4. Bus event for the HUD badge
-
-New outbound event:
-
-```swift
-case escalated(EscalationDecision)
-```
-
-Emitted once when fallback fires. HUD renders an unobtrusive badge inline with the affected message: "Escalated to Opus — Ollama returned malformed tool call" (or whichever `OllamaFailureKind` fired). The badge stays with that specific message; subsequent messages are visually clean.
-
-The badge is HUD-side only — it does not affect the chat message content, persistence, or replay log shape.
-
-### 5. Per-turn vs sticky
-
-**Per-turn.** Next user message starts fresh on Ollama. Reasoning: one Ollama failure on a Python question doesn't mean the next "what time is it" should go to Opus.
-
-User can manually pin a conversation to Anthropic via Settings. Manual pin overrides escalation logic; in that mode, no escalation badges fire because no escalation can fire.
-
-### 6. Settings UX
-
-Settings → Provider section gets one new control:
-
- **Provider preference:** `Local-first (recommended)` / `Anthropic only` / `Ollama only`
- `Local-first` is the new default; corresponds to `provider: "ollama"` plus escalation enabled.
- `Anthropic only` pins to Anthropic, escalation moot.
- `Ollama only` pins to Ollama AND disables escalation — Ollama failures surface as errors. Useful for hard-offline / privacy-strict mode.
-
-The existing `default-config.json` `provider:` field continues to drive the runtime; new logic decides whether escalation is wired based on a sibling `escalationEnabled` field that defaults to `true` only when `provider == "ollama"`.
-
-### 7. Testing
-
-Three eval lanes added to the Harness package:
-
- **Reactive fallback fires correctly** — fixture: Ollama returns `malformedToolCall`; assert orchestrator switches to Anthropic mid-turn AND emits one `escalated` bus event.
- **Escalation budget honored** — fixture: Ollama fails AND Anthropic also fails on the same turn; assert orchestrator surfaces a structured error, does not loop, emits exactly one `escalated` event.
- **Pinned mode disables escalation** — config: `provider=ollama, escalationEnabled=false` + Ollama failure → surface error directly, zero `escalated` events.
-
-No new fixture corpus needed; leverages existing `FixtureKind` cases in `MockLLMProvider`.
-
-### 8. Non-goals
-
- No predictive routing.
- No "stream Anthropic continuing Ollama's partial output" — clean restart only.
- No automatic re-Ollama after Anthropic finishes — once escalated, the rest of the turn stays on Anthropic.
- No memory extraction changes; that pipeline is independent and stays on Ollama.
- No changes to non-chat surfaces (TTS, MCP, voice loop) — they have their own provider stories.
- No new GitHub issue label or milestone; this is a v0.5+ migration item that the user wants brought forward.
-
-### 9. Effort estimate
-
-Single PR, ~3-4 hours:
-
-| Subtask | Estimate |
-|---|---|
-| `default-config.json` flip + Settings UI control | 30 min |
-| Orchestrator escalation logic extension + budget tracking | 60 min |
-| Bus event + HUD badge component | 60 min |
-| Harness tests (3 lanes) | 60 min |
-| Docs + comments | 15 min |
-
-## Success criteria
-
- Default fresh-launch experience uses Ollama for chat turns.
- A turn that fails on Ollama via any `OllamaFailureKind` automatically retries on Anthropic and the user sees a single coherent reply with a badge.
- A turn that fails on both providers shows a structured error, not an infinite retry.
- A user with `Ollama only` mode sees the Ollama error directly with no escalation.
- All existing tests pass; three new escalation tests pass.
- Memory extraction is unaffected.
- The chat surface still streams tokens at acceptable latency (no perceptible regression).
-
-## Open questions for the user
-
-None blocking — design is concrete enough to implement. If anything below is wrong, push back before the spec is committed.
-
- Should the badge wording differ per `OllamaFailureKind`, or just say "Escalated to Opus"? Current design: differentiate, because the reason is small additional information that helps the user understand when Ollama is struggling.
- Should the orchestrator emit a single `bus.escalated` per turn, or stream per-attempt diagnostics? Current design: one per turn, keeps the bus contract simple.
@@ -159,20 +159,7 @@ extension BusOutbound: Codable {
            try container.encode(text, forKey: .text)
        case .audioLevel(let rms):
            try container.encode(Discriminator.audioLevel, forKey: .type)
-            // Issue #47: JSON has no canonical encoding for `Float.nan` or
-            // `±Float.infinity`. Foundation's `JSONEncoder` defaults to
-            // throwing for non-finite floats (`JSONEncoder.NonConformingFloat-
-            // EncodingStrategy.throw`), which would crash the per-frame bus
-            // path the moment `AudioLevelEmitter` produces a NaN — easy to
-            // hit on a CoreAudio over-/underflow or a buffer of all-zero
-            // samples. Clamp non-finite to 0.0 inline at the encode site so
-            // the rms float in the wire JSON is always a finite, ring-shader-
-            // safe number. The HUD-side consumer (`webview/packages/hud/src/
-            // bus/client.ts`) currently no-ops on audioLevel; the clamp is
-            // defensive against the bug becoming active once the consumer is
-            // wired up.
-            let safe = rms.isFinite ? rms : 0.0
-            try container.encode(safe, forKey: .rms)
+            try container.encode(rms, forKey: .rms)
        case .toolCallStart(let id, let name, let argsPreview):
            try container.encode(Discriminator.toolCallStart, forKey: .type)
            try container.encode(id.uuidString.lowercased(), forKey: .id)
@@ -123,44 +123,6 @@ final class CodableRoundTripTests: XCTestCase {
        )
    }

-    /// Issue #47: `BusOutbound.audioLevel` encodes a `Float`, and Foundation's
-    /// default `JSONEncoder.NonConformingFloatEncodingStrategy` is `.throw`.
-    /// A non-finite `rms` (NaN from a CoreAudio over-/underflow, or ±∞ from a
-    /// pathological emitter buffer) would crash the per-frame bus path inside
-    /// `WebviewBridge.sendRaw`. The encode site in `BusOutbound.swift` clamps
-    /// non-finite floats to `0.0`; this test pins the contract so the clamp
-    /// can't silently regress.
-    func test_audioLevel_nanIsClampedToZero() throws {
-        let encoded = try BusCoder.makeEncoder().encode(BusOutbound.audioLevel(rms: .nan))
-        let decoded = try BusCoder.makeDecoder().decode(BusOutbound.self, from: encoded)
-        guard case .audioLevel(let rms) = decoded else {
-            XCTFail("expected .audioLevel after round-trip, got \(decoded)")
-            return
-        }
-        XCTAssertEqual(rms, 0.0, "NaN rms must be clamped to 0.0 at encode time (#47)")
-        XCTAssertTrue(rms.isFinite, "post-clamp rms must be finite")
-    }
-
-    /// Companion to `test_audioLevel_nanIsClampedToZero` — covers the ±∞
-    /// edge cases. CoreAudio drivers don't normally emit infinities, but the
-    /// encode-time clamp is sourced from `Float.isFinite`, which covers both
-    /// NaN and ±∞ via one check; locking the contract here prevents a future
-    /// refactor from narrowing the guard to NaN-only.
-    func test_audioLevel_infinityIsClampedToZero() throws {
-        let encoder = BusCoder.makeEncoder()
-        let decoder = BusCoder.makeDecoder()
-
-        for value in [Float.infinity, -Float.infinity] {
-            let encoded = try encoder.encode(BusOutbound.audioLevel(rms: value))
-            let decoded = try decoder.decode(BusOutbound.self, from: encoded)
-            guard case .audioLevel(let rms) = decoded else {
-                XCTFail("expected .audioLevel for \(value)")
-                continue
-            }
-            XCTAssertEqual(rms, 0.0, "±∞ rms (\(value)) must be clamped to 0.0 (#47)")
-        }
-    }
-
    func test_roundTrip_toolCallStart() throws {
        let id = UUID(uuidString: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000")!
        try assertOutboundRoundTrips(
@@ -28,16 +28,6 @@ public protocol STTWarningLogger: Sendable {
 public enum STTBackendSelector {

    // MARK: - Valid backend strings
-    //
-    // Canonical backend identifiers. Snake_case is the wire shape stored in
-    // `PerTurnSnapshot.stt.backend`. Call sites (`AppDelegate.sttBackend`)
-    // SHOULD reference these constants rather than the bare string literals;
-    // `STTBackendSwitchTests.testB5_canonicalConstantsRoundTripThroughMake`
-    // locks the round-trip contract by asserting both that the constants
-    // map to the right `STTProvider` AND that camelCase string literals
-    // (the pre-2026-05-12 anti-pattern from Issue #29 / #37) fall through
-    // to the default branch with a warning. Do not rename without updating
-    // `PerTurnSnapshot` and the regression test in lockstep.

    public static let backendSpeechAnalyzer = "speech_analyzer"
    public static let backendWhisperKit = "whisperkit"
@@ -77,16 +77,6 @@ pnpm --filter @jarvis/hud build

 DEST="$REPO_ROOT/App/Resources/webview"
 mkdir -p "$DEST"
-mkdir -p "$DEST/assets"
-
-# Issue #46: Vite emits content-hashed asset names (e.g. `index-CXPb0I5z.js`),
-# so the active bundle filename changes on every dependency or source edit.
-# Without explicit cleanup, stale chunks accumulate in `assets/` because we
-# don't pass `--delete` to rsync below. Sweep the asset glob (JS + maps + CSS)
-# before the rsync drops the fresh bundle. `bus-harness.html`, `index.html`,
-# and the directory's `.gitignore` live one level up (in $DEST), not in
-# $DEST/assets, so they are not at risk from this rm.
-rm -f "$DEST"/assets/*.js "$DEST"/assets/*.js.map "$DEST"/assets/*.css "$DEST"/assets/*.css.map

 echo "[build-webview] rsync dist/ -> $DEST"
 # --exclude bus-harness.html: keep 02-03's committed copy intact (parity
@@ -95,7 +85,6 @@ echo "[build-webview] rsync dist/ -> $DEST"
 # --exclude .gitignore: preserve the App/Resources/webview/.gitignore that
 #   lets index.html stay source-committed while assets/ regenerates.
 # We do NOT pass --delete: other vendored assets coexist in this dir.
-# (The explicit `rm -f` above handles stale `assets/` chunks; see #46.)
 rsync -a \
      --exclude=bus-harness.html \
      --exclude=.gitignore \