A review was passed on its count and its lines alone. A review with an
option whose value the process had changed after the card was made, or with
a value to read, went on to store with what the card never showed (proved
by a second independent review).
A review is a screen too: before it is passed, and before it is answered
with "validate", what it has of its own is held to the record of what the
card displayed (screenDiffers), like any other screen. Such a run stops
with nothing stored, and the card to go on with shows the review's inputs
with the values the process holds now and its values to read. The values
the card gave for a review's own inputs are sent with its answer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three cases an independent review proved against the first version, each
with a test that fails without its fix:
- a review with a warning and an error was answered with 'validate first'
before its lines were read, and a process that is not core's streamed one
went on to store. The lines are now judged first, for every process, and
'validate first' is only answered for core's own streamed process; a
review with no lines is not passed.
- a screen outside the process's list of steps (an optional step), with a
defaulted option, was passed although the card never displayed it. The
stored proposal now keeps a record of what the card displayed, and a screen
is passed only against it; a screen the process changed while it ran and
every screen of a state-machine process stop.
- a job the person may not read was reported as running. A job that was not
read is reported as exactly that, and the action fails.
Also: a status check cancels nothing; a run still working is 'started and
has not finished'; the names on a card are in the application's order;
every input is on the card, also one left empty.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
render_widget rendered a widget that was allowed by name and had no
withWidgetTables entry without any check of what it reads. It now fails
closed: a widget is rendered only when it is allowed, its tables are
declared, and every one of them may be read by the assistant and by the
signed-in person (asked of the application as them).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A tool call is a virtual thread, and the first call of a turn works out what
the person is offered by waiting for another one. ToolCallService did that
inside synchronized(admission), which keeps the carrier thread: with two
processors a batch of tool calls, and with one processor every first tool
call of a turn, waited out toolCallTimeoutSeconds, and the person was then
offered no write and no process tool for that turn.
An admission is now guarded by a ReentrantLock. FewProcessorsTest runs in
JVMs with one and with two processors (two surefire executions) and fails
there without the fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first card showed the first 300 characters of a screen's text and then
passed the screen. It now shows the whole text (up to 2,000 characters), and
a screen whose text is longer is one the card did not show in full: the run
stops there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A widget is code of the application and can show rows of any table, so
render_widget could hand a model the rows of a table the assistant may not
read. The tool now refuses, before the application is asked, every widget
the host did not allow by name (withAllowedWidgetNames, empty by default),
one it hid, and one that reads a table the assistant may not read
(new: withWidgetTables).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs/one-card-for-a-set.md is the design and the safety argument for parts A
to D; README, UPGRADE, CHANGELOG and the agent notes follow it. UI API
extension assistant 1.11.0 (additive): AssistantActionV1.recordCount,
records and recordsBefore for a run over a set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A person the application refuses is refused before a card where the
application says so beforehand; the confirm-time refusal (a permission that
goes between the card and the confirmation) keeps its tests, with the UI's
own status and message. The tool-set file changes in one description
(run_process), replaced as text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A confirmed run_process goes through the process's own init and step
operations as the person and passes a screen for them only when it shows
nothing their card did not: its text and inputs were on the card with the
values the process has now, and a review counts exactly the records of the
card and, with every record validated first, has no warning and no error.
Anything else comes back to the person with a new card and nothing stored.
The set is frozen by primary key and by one digest over its records as the
person read them; a set that changed is not run. The card keeps what the
records were (how many, a sample of 20) and lists the whole set by name.
The assistant no longer creates a job: when the application itself hands the
work to a background job, the job is the person's, it is waited for, and its
outcome (rows done, failed and why) is the card's. A job the application
created waiting is cancelled and the run reported as not done.
A change to records of a table is proposed only to a person the application
lets make it (what it tells their own screens); otherwise they are told so
and there is no card.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
After an independent review of the process tools. Each change is described
by the guarantee it gives.
- Only a reviewed process runs, decided when the application runs. A host
registers the processes it reviewed for the assistant in
AssistantQBitConfig (withReviewedProcesses, or
withReviewedProcessesResource for a file on its classpath). With no list,
only a table's own bulk edit and bulk delete are runnable: they act on
records of a table the person may already change through the assistant.
With a list: exactly the listed processes and those two, each still
subject to every never-runnable rule, to an administrator's narrowing row
and to the person's own permission. RunnableProcessReview stays as the
way a host notices drift in its build, and now also fails when the
reviewed file is not the registered list.
- An input is only a field a screen asks a person for. A screen's field
whose name the process keeps for its own working is never an input
(ProcessControlNames: the inputs of the process's backend steps, and a
fixed set this QBit owns, checked by a test against the QQQ version it
builds with). The person is told the field cannot be set through the
assistant; the process stays runnable for its other fields.
- A person confirms what they were shown. A run stops at every later screen
that has something to show (a form, values to read, a text, a list of
records), and going on is a second card that shows it. Only a screen with
nothing to show is passed. The screen a run starts at is on the first
card.
- A run is over exactly the records its card counted. A filter is resolved
when the run is proposed, to at most 500 primary keys (more is refused,
for the person to narrow); the confirmed run is sent those keys and does
not start when one of them is gone.
- A process that may run as a durable job is created waiting, or not run:
where the application does not offer the operation that creates a job,
the run is refused.
- Text of the application reaches a model only inside the data envelope
every tool result uses: a process's messages, what a screen shows, the
application's message for a refusal or a failure. That holds for a
result, for a card's lines, for the summary a later request keeps of a
process step, for what a later request is told became of a confirmed run,
and for the thread's own message about it (ToolLabels.forModel,
MessageParts.modelText).
- A card goes on only with the run as it stood when the card was made: a
run counts a version up at every step and stop, and an older card of the
same run is refused.
One expectation of ChatToolSetTest changes: the scenario
everythingAsAnotherPerson no longer holds the four process tools. That host
registered no reviewed list, and its person may run processes of another
QBit and change no table, so the assistant runs no process for them.
ToolCallChecksTest is unchanged. No new tool. AssistantStore is still the
only code that calls data actions.
README, UPGRADE.md, CHANGELOG.md, CLAUDE.md and section 4.5 of
docs/actions-and-mcp.md say the same.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Process tools (package A4 of docs/actions-and-mcp.md), in tools/process:
list_processes, describe_process, run_process and get_run_status.
- The list and the description come from the person's own metadata, asked
as them: a process they may not run is never listed or described, and is
refused by name in the words used for a process that does not exist.
- run_process only proposes. Inputs are checked against the fields the
process's screens declare before a card exists (unknown input, wrong
type, missing required; no value is made up). The card (pending action
kind process_run) shows the process, every input, the records and the
steps that stop for the person.
- The confirmed run is the person's: it runs through the UI API with the
confirming request's session, and a run whose records are no longer the
ones the card counted does not start.
- A process eligible to run as a durable job is created as one and never
started by the assistant; any other runs through its own init and step
operations until it ends or needs the person (a review, a required field
with no value), where going on takes a new card.
- A confirmed run never holds its pending action RUNNING: the action ends
when the run was started, and get_run_status reports where it stands.
- What is never runnable through the assistant is decided in one place
(ProcessRunnability): denied to the assistant channel, the assistant's
own, data access not READ_WRITE, hidden, offered by no screen, on a table
the assistant may not change, or with a screen it cannot present.
Review findings, by the guarantee each gives:
- A host notices each process that becomes runnable through the assistant:
RunnableProcessReview fails the host's build when the runnable list
differs from its committed file.
- An administrator is warned before the data-access migration opens a
table they left read-only: UPGRADE.md has a query with the migration's
own predicate, tested against the changeset.
- No tool says confirmation can be turned off (the cached request prefix
changes once).
- No model is called without a spending limit in force: the routing
classifier asks for its own model. The administrator's Test connection
is the one documented exemption.
Also: a scheduled task is offered run_process only with its write
approval; a test that a confirmed update into a record-security key the
person lacks is refused by the application and changes nothing; UI API
extension assistant 1.10.0 (additive).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Package A2 of the actions design (docs/actions-and-mcp.md, sections 2 and 3),
with two owner decisions of 2026-11-12, and five findings of an independent
review of the tool boundary, each closed by the guarantee it gives.
Writes follow the person
- The data access of a table or process is declared in versioned code:
AssistantQBitConfig.withDefaultTableAccess / withDefaultProcessAccess (both
READ_WRITE) and a pin per object (withTableAccess, withProcessAccess).
READ_WRITE grants nothing: the assistant may propose what the signed-in
person may do themselves, and every change waits for their confirmation.
- An administrator's assistant_data_access row can only narrow (READ, NONE).
It never raises a code default, a pin or a table kept from AI.
- Every assistant_* table and every process of the QBit is NONE by a pin in
code that no row and no host pin lifts.
- The write tools are offered to a person who may create, edit or delete
records of some table (asked of the UI API as that person, once per offer,
within the tool-call time limit; no answer means no write tool). GET /config
features.writes is that answer for the person.
- Settings that cannot be read, and were never read, allow nothing.
- The table action "Add rows for every table" is retired. The changeset
assistant-data-access-follow-user removes the unedited READ rows it wrote,
and no other row.
No answer without a spending limit
- A person for whom no spending limit is in force (BudgetService.limitInForce)
is refused: the turn before anything is stored, every model call, every tool
call, every embedding request, a scheduled turn. Restoring a limit restores
service on the next request.
Review findings
- A pending action is never marked expired over its outcome: expiry is a
decision made through the same claim as confirming and cancelling.
- No action stays RUNNING for ever: retention ends one left running for more
than an hour as FAILED ("outcome unknown, check the record"), with a log row.
- A person is the session the authentication module resolved, not the object
passed in: a hand-made permission gives nothing, a revoked one is gone.
- The assistant's own reads get their context from the tool-call service, for
a person it checked; there is no public way to make a tool context from a
session id, a gateway and a policy.
- The published test-jar holds the testing package only.
- AssistantStore's decision methods are final.
See CHANGELOG.md and UPGRADE.md (what a host must apply before deploying).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The design this branch builds package A2 of. It is merged here so that the
sentences of the design that the code and the owner's decisions of 2026-11-12
have overtaken can be corrected in the same change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes the findings of a third independent review of the tool boundary and
builds the pending-action package of the actions design on top.
Guarantees:
- A pending action is confirmed or cancelled once, by exactly one request,
on one server or several: the decision is an insert under a unique key
(new table assistant_pending_action_claim). Whatever fails after the claim
ends in FAILED or EXECUTED with a tool-call row, never in RUNNING.
- A tool cannot be run around the tool-call service from code outside the
assistant's packages: execute, log and withdraw are package-private; a
tool call request, a confirmed tool call and a tool context have no public
constructor and are made only with the service's permit; the runtime has
no public getter for the tool registry, the UI API gateway or its tool
families. A host's own ToolFamily and AssistantTool compile unchanged.
- A signed-in person is one person: a session with no HTTP request is made a
person only when the authentication module resolves the session's own id
to the user the session names. The turn engine no longer makes a person.
- Only the credential a request's session was resolved from is forwarded to
the UI API.
- A tool call that was cut short leaves no proposal anybody could confirm.
- The policy a tool call runs under is read fresh on every call.
- The hard budget is read on every call with one aggregate query per budget.
- The input kept in the tool-call log is redacted with the administrator's
custom patterns too.
Pending actions (design package A3):
- update_record and delete_record read the record as the person when they
propose; the card shows each field before and after (a delete: what the
record holds), after the exposure rules of get_record.
- What was approved is what is written: the proposal keeps a version of the
record (a digest, never values); a confirmed update or delete reads the
record again and refuses when it changed, is gone or cannot be read.
- actionKind (record_create, record_update, record_delete, or the proposing
tool's name), GET /assistant/actions (the person's own list), and
approvalRetentionDays is now read by the retention process.
- UI API extension assistant 1.9.0 (additive).
Schema: three columns and two indexes on assistant_pending_action, and the
table assistant_pending_action_claim (docs/schema-postgres.sql, UPGRADE.md).
ChatToolSetTest and ToolCallChecksTest pass unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An independent security review of engine.ToolCallService (after PR 106)
found what a caller could still hand it. The chat's turn engine is the
only caller today and builds everything correctly, so none of it was
reachable; it is closed before an MCP endpoint calls the service. The
rule: every tool call runs as the signed-in person with their current
permissions and budget, never as the assistant; a refusal happens before
any data action; every call that ran has a log row with redacted input.
Numbered as in the review:
1. A caller cannot supply a policy. The service reads it
(PolicyService.current(false).tools(), narrowed for a scheduled
task's conversation) and builds the tool Context itself; a caller
hands it a tools.registry.ToolCall (person, id, name, input).
Every change always shows a confirmation card (owner, 2026-11-12):
ToolPolicy.writesRequireConfirmation is removed and UiApiToolbox
always proposes. The assistant_policy column stays and is no longer
read; no migration.
2. New SignedInPerson binds a session to the credentials forwarded to
the UI API. No public constructor: ofRequest(Context), only for
AssistantSpecs (ArchUnit), or ofSession(session). The context's
gateway is always runtime.getUiApiGateway(). AssistantApi and
TurnEngine lose withCredentials.
3. The hard budget is read on every call, not once per scope.
executeAndLog(call, conversationId, hipaaRoute) makes the scope.
4. confirm(person, pendingActionId) replaces executeConfirmed,
confirmationRefusal and logConfirmed: the service loads the stored
action of that person, checks it, claims it once, runs it, marks it
and writes the row. AssistantApi.confirmAction is a thin caller and
the only one (ArchUnit).
5. The toolboxes cannot be called around the service: their entry
points are package-private, the runtime has no getter for a toolbox
(each family is handed its own), and ArchUnit forbids calls into
tools.. from outside it except through the registry. The assistant's
own reads (starter prompts, knowledge re-read) use the new read-only
UiApiToolbox.read.
6. TurnEngine.executeTools writes each started call's row in a per-call
finally: after an interruption of the engine, after a runtime
exception while a result is processed or logged, and for a call cut
short by its time limit, with the real outcome when the worker
finished. A row that cannot be written for a call that changed data
is logged at ERROR.
7. Whatever fails after a confirmation's claim ends in FAILED with a
row, never in RUNNING.
8. The service checks that the scope's conversation and turn belong to
the call's person and works out the row's client channel itself
(ToolCallScope.clientChannel is gone). hipaaRoute stays the
caller's; the javadoc says why.
9. AssistantQBitConfig.withToolFamily throws once the QBit is produced.
Tests: ToolCallServiceTest (one per item, on the service directly),
ToolCallRowsTest (item 6; all three fail on develop), and
ToolCallArchitectureTest (items 2, 4, 5). ChatToolSetTest and
ToolCallChecksTest pass with unchanged expectations.
UiApiToolsSecurityTest's two tests that ran writes with confirmation off
now propose and confirm.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
engine.ToolCallService trusted its caller for several checks. The chat's
turn engine made them around the service; a caller with no chat turn (an
MCP endpoint, later) would have skipped them. The rule that now holds for
any caller: a tool call runs as the signed-in person with their current
permissions and budget, a refusal happens before any data action, and the
call is logged with redacted input.
1. execute refuses a tool the person is not offered now. It builds the
offer from the request's policy and session (once per scope). Before,
only the turn engine's allowed-tools set did, and navigate and
search_help ran although the policy had switched them off.
2. A request without a policy is refused. UiApiToolbox, KnowledgeTool
and BulkLoadTools read a missing policy as "every tool"; they refuse.
3. A request whose context was made for another session than its own is
refused, for a call and for a confirmation. ConfirmedToolCall carries
the confirming session.
4. New executeAndLog: runs the call and writes the assistant_tool_call
row, redacting the input itself, also for a refused call. Redaction
and the row moved out of TurnEngine (redactInput is gone; what a
presentation logs is AssistantTool.inputForLog). The turn engine runs
its calls in parallel under its own time limit and writes rows in
call order, so it uses the two halves, execute and
log(request, outcome); an ArchUnit rule keeps every other class on
executeAndLog. The chat's rows are unchanged.
5. The service's javadoc says what it enforces and what a caller still
supplies (rate limiting, per-request call limits and timeouts,
classification).
6. The confirm route refuses while the kill switch is on (503
KILL_SWITCH) and when the policy no longer allows the tool (403),
before the pending action is claimed, so it stays pending.
7. Tool families are registered explicitly: the QBit's own list
(AssistantRuntime.ownToolFamilies) plus
AssistantQBitConfig.withToolFamily for a host or another QBit. The
classpath scan is gone. The registered names are logged once at
startup; a duplicate name or an empty registry stops the start.
8. ToolRegistry.definitions sorts the keys of every object of an input
schema, so two JVMs send the same bytes (a Map.of schema iterated in
a per-JVM order, and the provider mappings serialise in iteration
order).
9. The service itself requires assistant access, checks the kill switch
(fresh) and the hard budget (the policy's hard limits and a stopped
budget row, read without a budget event or alert, when a scope's
first call arrives). New BudgetService.stoppedReason.
Tests: ToolCallServiceTest (fixes 1 to 4, 6, 9, called with no turn),
ToolRegistryTest (7, 8), ToolCallArchitectureTest (the new rule).
ChatToolSetTest and ToolCallChecksTest pass unchanged. Test helpers that
handed a tool a null policy now hand it the defaults.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every tool is registered once in tools.registry.ToolRegistry: its name, its
kind (READ, PROPOSE, DISPLAY), the checks it runs, its definition and how one
call of it runs. The chat's tool list, a tool call of a turn and a confirmed
write all look a tool up there; the turn engine and the confirm route no
longer choose a tool family with an if-chain.
"Run one tool call for this person under this policy, and log it" moves
out of TurnEngine into engine.ToolCallService, which the confirm route uses
too: the refusal of a tool that is not offered, the call (with the person's
own session) and the assistant_tool_call row.
What moved where:
- ContextBuilder.tools: the per-family blocks become
ToolRegistry.definitions(ToolOffer); each family's block is its
AssistantTool.definition (UiApiToolFamily, engine.KernelToolFamily,
KnowledgeToolFamily, PresentResultsToolFamily, BulkLoadToolFamily).
isStrict moves to ToolRegistry.isStrict.
- TurnEngine.executeTools: the 'Unknown tool' refusal is
ToolCallService.refusal; the dispatch is ToolCallService.execute; each
branch is its family's AssistantTool.execute (the data families keep the
QContext init and clear around the call; the presenter stays one per turn
through ToolCallScope.state).
- TurnEngine.recordToolResult: the row is built by ToolCallService.log; the
bulk-load log reduction and search_knowledge's operation are the tools'
forLog and operationWithoutDetail.
- AssistantApi.confirmAction: the if-chain is
ToolCallService.executeConfirmed; the row is ToolCallService.logConfirmed.
UiApiToolbox, AnalysisTools, BulkLoadTools, KnowledgeTool, PresentResultsTool
and the core kernel keep all of their behaviour. A tool family is a class
under com.kingsrook.qbits.assistant.tools that implements ToolFamily; it is
found at startup, so a new family is new files only. The kernel family lives
in engine and is named by the runtime, because nothing under tools may touch
the kernel (ArchitectureTest).
Tests: ChatToolSetTest compares the chat's tool list (names, order,
descriptions, schemas, strict flags, in six scenarios) with the list written
from origin/develop at e02658d before any production code changed.
ToolCallChecksTest (permission, tool switch, data access, the person's own
request, confirmation, and the log row of each refusal) passes unchanged on
the code before and after. ToolRegistryTest and ToolCallArchitectureTest cover
the registry and bind 'only ToolCallService runs or logs a tool call'. No
existing test changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Moves qqq.snapshot.version from 4.1.0-RC.25 to 4.1.0-RC.32, the version
applications (GG Forge) pin. No behaviour change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The write-mode switch is not on develop but exists as an open draft
pull request (#21). Say so, and say what happens to it if the owner
confirms that every write is confirmed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Draft design and work plan for owner review. Nothing is implemented here.
- Writes follow the person's permissions by default: data access defaults
declared in code, an administrator can only restrict, every write is
confirmed on a card that shows the values before and after.
- New tools: run a process the person may run, create and edit saved
reports and saved analyses, schedule delivery by email.
- An MCP endpoint that serves the same tool registry as chat: read-only
first, then writes as proposals approved in the application.
- Test strategy, repositories and release order, risks, decisions for the
owner, and work packages that can be built in parallel.
docs/DESIGN.md gets a pointer under "Next phases".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
On a host with QInstance.enforcePermissionsInCoreActions on, a person with
assistant.hasAccess and without assistant.admin was refused before any model
call ("Not authorized to access the assistant admin data."). The assistant
reads its settings (policy, providers, models, prices, budgets, data access)
and writes that person's messages, turns, tool calls, pending actions and
usage through tables whose permission rule is assistant.admin, with the
person's session. On a host without core enforcement nothing checked that
rule for the store, so it was never seen.
AssistantStore, the only package allowed to call QQQ data actions, now marks
every one of its calls as the assistant's own service code
(withPermissionBypass with a reason), the way qbit-collaboration and
qbit-backups do. Only the table permission check is skipped, for those calls:
- the session stays the person's: writes are attributed to them, and the
owner record locks keep every other person's rows out (core does not relax
record locks for a bypass);
- the tables' permission rules are unchanged: the tables stay closed to that
person in the UI, the UI API and the assistant's tools;
- who may call is decided before the store: every operation of the assistant
API requires assistant access, and the save rules of budgets and overrides
require assistant.admin themselves.
A person's own budget. GET /config has "budgets" (UI API extension assistant
1.8.0): the budgets scoped to that user or to a permission that user holds,
with used, limit, percent, state and when the count starts again. Budgets
shared by several people are not listed. The same lines ride beside the
person's question (<assistant_budget>), so "how much of my budget have I
used?" has an answer.
CoreEnforcementTest runs on the fixture instance with core enforcement on.
Run without the store change, four of its five tests failed at the first
store read; the fifth (own budget) was written afterwards.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A budget (Assistant > Budgets) can count over a WEEK: the ISO week in UTC,
Monday 00:00:00 UTC up to the next Monday 00:00:00 UTC. DAY and MONTH are
unchanged and there is no schema change (period is text).
The refusal at a limit now says which limit, how much, when the count starts
again and who can change it: "The assistant has reached the weekly limit of
$500.00 of the budget 'Everyone, a week'. It starts again on Monday 19 October
2026 at 00:00 UTC. An administrator can raise the limit or grant an override."
The warning says "weekly" for a weekly budget.
New config budgetCostLimitCeilingUsd (default 1,000,000, null for none): a
cost budget above it is refused when saved. A budget is created or changed
only by a session that holds assistant.admin; the save rule now checks it as
it already did for overrides, besides the table's permission rules.
Budgets are read from their table at every evaluation and are not cached, so
a changed limit applies to the next question. That was already so; it is now
stated and tested.
Tests (BudgetServiceTest): the week boundary in UTC, including a Sunday
evening in Chicago that is Monday in UTC and a week across a year end; the
micro-USD to dollar conversion at the limit (499,999,999 micros warn, one more
refuses); the refusal sentence and HTTP 429 BUDGET for a new question; a
changed limit taking effect on the running service; the ceiling; and a person
without assistant.admin refused by the table's permission and by the save.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
save_analysis proposes keeping an analyze_records question as a saved analysis the user owns
and, when asked, a daily schedule emailed to them. One pending action lists everything that
will be created with the numbers as they are now; nothing exists until the user confirms it
(never auto-confirmed). On confirmation both records are created through the data-analysis
tables' own insert operations with the confirming user's session. Offered only with the
data-analysis extension and data access READ_WRITE on data_analysis_saved (a schedule also
needs it on data_analysis_schedule); the user's own insert permission is read from
GET /metaData first.
A schedule that could never run is refused when proposed and again at confirmation, with
what is missing: the instance is read (a schedule table, a scheduler on
data_analysis_run_schedules) and the host is asked through
AssistantQBitConfig.withScheduledDeliveryCheck.
Confirming any pending action now adds a message of the assistant to the conversation
(what was done, links to the records), and each earlier proposal carries what became of it
in the next request (done, failed, cancelled, expired). Before, the model only ever saw
'waiting for confirmation'.
Rule 14 for every model: ask one short question when a request is ambiguous in a way that
changes the result (table, field, time zone); the user's browser time zone is stated in the
per-user context. Golden task clarify-ambiguous-field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
OPERATIONS stays the list of core /qqq/v1 operations (every one is invocable on any
instance); analyze_records moves to EXTENSION_OPERATIONS, offered and invocable only where
the data-analysis extension is registered. A test pins that it is neither offered nor
invocable without the extension.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A new read tool: group a table by one or two fields (a date field optionally by a calendar
unit) and compute a count, sum, average, minimum, maximum or distinct count per group, with
the usual filter. It is one call of the data-analysis qbit's pivot operation
(POST /qbit/data-analysis/tables/{table}/pivot) through the same gateway and with the
signed-in user's session, so table read, the table's analyze permission, field access and
record locks decide as on the Analyses screens. The assistant only narrows it: data access
READ on the table, fields whose values it may see, the policy's row cap. Offered only where
the data-analysis extension is registered; no production dependency on that qbit.
Tests run against the released data-analysis qbit served by the real UI API.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.2 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The watchdog ran the deadline logic after two database reads and heartbeat() was synchronized on the monitor that finish() needs, so one blocked database call stopped the deadline, the force-finalize and the final message.end. The deadline now runs first with no database access, housekeeping runs on a bounded abandonable worker, finish() has a guard that ends the stream with an error event, and every phase logs at INFO.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The panel reloads the conversation at message.end. A tool-using turn must
already have stored the real title, the question and answer parts and the
tool-call rows then, not the transcript redactor's placeholders
(changed:v1, [], {}). The redactor is always attached to a turn, so this is
independent of Secured Data. Fails without the flush-before-message.end
ordering (RC.24), passes on develop and RC.25.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>