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james.maesandCodex GPT-6 38dd5c1488 feat: implement Windows MarkdownViewr (#35)
This replaces the blocked history in PR #3 with one properly attributed,
signed/DCO commit. The owner personally reviewed and approved PR #3 in
the release session.

**No file changes from the approved candidate:** both
baee14f492 and
e605df62c4 have exact Git tree
a85912cbad. Original PR #3 and its commits
are preserved for review history. Historical commits were locally signed
but GitHub reported no_user; protected merge checks those introduced
commits even for squash merging. This commit resolves attribution
without bypassing or weakening signature rules.

The reader, Settings, themes, source highlighting/split, live reload,
file associations, Print/PDF, About credits, toolbar/footer/editor
fixes, user-first README/screenshots and developer guides are exactly
the approved implementation. Stable/dev separation and protected Azure
signing caller are unchanged.

Evidence:
- Approved tree baee14f / CI38285775463 passes all checks. Downloaded
focused29/29, published111/111, stable110/110 and dev110/110 TRXs have
zero failures/skips. Core coverage100% lines/98.86% branches; actual
update/restart/coexistence/default-preservation receipts verify.
- New single-commit hooks, online workflow security, signing and DCO
pass. GitHub must rerun all required checks on this commit; results are
not copied across SHAs.
- Live repository setup validates18 Actions-bound checks, with only
fuzzing added and all prior protections preserved.
- OpenSSF project15417 is now owner-reviewed and saved at70% under
owner-confirmed CDLA-Permissive2.0. This is an in-progress assessment,
not a passing badge.
- Production CI OIDC and signed1.0/dev publication remain required;
local representative signing is not CI proof.

Substantial AI assistance: Codex (GPT-6). Supersedes PR #3. Release work
remains tracked in #33.

Closes #4, #6, #7, #8, #9, #10, #11, #12, #13, #14, #15, #16, #17, #18,
#19, #20, #21, #22, #23, #24, #25, #26, #27, #28, #29, #32, #34.
Refs #1, #5, #30, #31, #33.

Signed-off-by: James Maes <james@kof22.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex GPT-6 <noreply@openai.com>
2026-10-12 14:01:42 -05:00

197 lines
8.0 KiB
C#

/*
* Copyright (c) 2026 James Maes
* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*/
using MarkdownViewr.Windows.Core.Documents;
namespace MarkdownViewr.Windows.Core.Tests;
/// <summary>Verifies document image isolation and Windows path rejection before any native file access.</summary>
public sealed class DocumentResourcePolicyTests
{
/// <summary>Generated fragments address only bounded heading identities, never an arbitrary native command.</summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData("#mv-heading-0", 1, 0)]
[InlineData("#mv-heading-2", 3, 2)]
[InlineData("#mv-heading-3", 3, null)]
[InlineData("#mv-heading-0", 0, null)]
[InlineData("#mv-heading--1", 3, null)]
[InlineData("#mv-heading-+1", 3, null)]
[InlineData("#mv-heading-2147483648", 3, null)]
[InlineData("#mv-heading-", 3, null)]
[InlineData("#heading", 3, null)]
[InlineData("?command=edit#mv-heading-0", 3, null)]
public void GetHeadingIndex_Fragment_RequiresBoundedGeneratedIndex(string suffix, int count, int? expected)
{
var policy = new DocumentResourcePolicy();
Assert.Equal(expected, policy.GetHeadingIndex(new Uri(policy.DocumentUri.AbsoluteUri + suffix), count));
}
/// <summary>Relative requests, another namespace/path/authority, and missing input cannot impersonate this document.</summary>
[Fact]
public void GetHeadingIndex_OtherDocumentOrAuthority_RejectsTarget()
{
var policy = new DocumentResourcePolicy();
Assert.Null(policy.GetHeadingIndex(new Uri("#mv-heading-0", UriKind.Relative), 1));
Assert.Null(policy.GetHeadingIndex(new Uri(new DocumentResourcePolicy().DocumentUri.AbsoluteUri + "#mv-heading-0"), 1));
Assert.Null(policy.GetHeadingIndex(new Uri(policy.DocumentUri, "other.html#mv-heading-0"), 1));
var authority = new UriBuilder(policy.DocumentUri) { Host = "example.com", Fragment = "mv-heading-0" };
Assert.Null(policy.GetHeadingIndex(authority.Uri, 1));
authority.Host = policy.DocumentUri.Host;
authority.UserName = "attacker";
Assert.Null(policy.GetHeadingIndex(authority.Uri, 1));
Assert.Throws<ArgumentNullException>(() => policy.GetHeadingIndex(null!, 1));
}
/// <summary>Each opened document has a distinct, inert HTTPS namespace.</summary>
[Fact]
public void Constructor_DifferentDocuments_UsesDistinctNamespaces()
{
var first = new DocumentResourcePolicy();
var second = new DocumentResourcePolicy();
Assert.NotEqual(first.DocumentUri, second.DocumentUri);
Assert.Equal("https", first.DocumentUri.Scheme);
Assert.Equal("viewer.markdownviewr.invalid", first.DocumentUri.Host);
Assert.EndsWith("/index.html", first.DocumentUri.AbsolutePath, StringComparison.Ordinal);
}
/// <summary>Supported local images retain their relative spelling and are decoded only once.</summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData("images/photo.PNG", "images/photo.PNG")]
[InlineData("images/hello%20world.jpg", "images/hello world.jpg")]
[InlineData("images/%252e%252e.png", "images/%2e%2e.png")]
[InlineData("diagram.svg#view", "diagram.svg")]
[InlineData("image.webp?cache=1", "image.webp")]
public void GetImageRelativePath_AllowedImage_ReturnsOnceDecodedPath(string path, string expected)
{
var policy = new DocumentResourcePolicy();
Assert.Equal(expected, policy.GetImageRelativePath(new Uri(policy.DocumentUri, path)));
}
/// <summary>Other origins, ports, credentials and document namespaces have no resource access.</summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData("http://viewer.markdownviewr.invalid/image.png")]
[InlineData("https://example.com/image.png")]
[InlineData("https://viewer.markdownviewr.invalid:444/image.png")]
[InlineData("https://user@viewer.markdownviewr.invalid/image.png")]
[InlineData("file:///C:/private.png")]
[InlineData("")]
public void GetImageRelativePath_ForeignRequest_DeniesAccess(string url)
{
Assert.Null(new DocumentResourcePolicy().GetImageRelativePath(new Uri(url)));
}
/// <summary>Supported local document types retain once-decoded literal paths, without providing shell commands.</summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData("child.md", "child.md")]
[InlineData("docs/child.MARKDOWN", "docs/child.MARKDOWN")]
[InlineData("child.mdown", "child.mdown")]
[InlineData("child.mkd", "child.mkd")]
[InlineData("child.txt", "child.txt")]
[InlineData("docs/caf%C3%A9%20%26%20%24HOME.md", "docs/café & $HOME.md")]
[InlineData("docs/%252e%252e.md", "docs/%2e%2e.md")]
public void GetDocumentRelativePath_SupportedType_DecodesOnlyOnce(string path, string expected)
{
var policy = new DocumentResourcePolicy();
Assert.Equal(expected, policy.GetDocumentRelativePath(new Uri(policy.DocumentUri, path)));
}
/// <summary>Documents reject queries, traversal, devices, alternate streams and executable/non-document targets before native access.</summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData("child.md?command=run")]
[InlineData("../private.md")]
[InlineData("docs/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fprivate.md")]
[InlineData("docs/CON.md")]
[InlineData("docs/child.md%3aprivate")]
[InlineData("docs/%5cprivate.md")]
[InlineData("docs/%00private.md")]
[InlineData("docs/folder./child.md")]
[InlineData("docs/folder%20/child.md")]
[InlineData("child.exe")]
[InlineData("child.lnk")]
[InlineData("child.png")]
public void GetDocumentRelativePath_UnsafeTarget_DeniesAccess(string path)
{
var policy = new DocumentResourcePolicy();
Assert.Null(policy.GetDocumentRelativePath(new Uri(policy.DocumentUri, path)));
}
/// <summary>Other namespaces, origins, schemes and relative requests never gain document-open authority.</summary>
[Fact]
public void GetDocumentRelativePath_ForeignContext_DeniesAccess()
{
var policy = new DocumentResourcePolicy();
Assert.Null(policy.GetDocumentRelativePath(new Uri("child.md", UriKind.Relative)));
Assert.Null(policy.GetDocumentRelativePath(new Uri(new DocumentResourcePolicy().DocumentUri, "child.md")));
Assert.Null(policy.GetDocumentRelativePath(new Uri("file:///C:/private.md")));
Assert.Null(policy.GetDocumentRelativePath(new Uri("https://example.com/child.md")));
Assert.Throws<ArgumentNullException>(() => policy.GetDocumentRelativePath(null!));
}
/// <summary>Requests cannot cross into another opened document.</summary>
[Fact]
public void GetImageRelativePath_OtherDocument_DeniesAccess()
{
var policy = new DocumentResourcePolicy();
var other = new DocumentResourcePolicy();
Assert.Null(policy.GetImageRelativePath(new Uri(other.DocumentUri, "image.png")));
}
/// <summary>Non-images, traversal, device names, encoded separators and filename aliases are refused.</summary>
[Theory]
[InlineData("index.html")]
[InlineData("script.js")]
[InlineData("../private.png")]
[InlineData("%2e%2e/private.png")]
[InlineData("images/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fprivate.png")]
[InlineData("images/%5cprivate.png")]
[InlineData("images/C%3a/private.png")]
[InlineData("images/%00private.png")]
[InlineData("images/%0aprivate.png")]
[InlineData("images/a%3f.png")]
[InlineData("images/a%2a.png")]
[InlineData("images/a%3c.png")]
[InlineData("images/a%7c.png")]
[InlineData("images//private.png")]
[InlineData("images/folder%20/private.png")]
[InlineData("images/folder./private.png")]
[InlineData("CON.png")]
[InlineData("images/LPT1.png")]
[InlineData("images/COM%C2%B9.png")]
public void GetImageRelativePath_UnsafePath_DeniesAccess(string path)
{
var policy = new DocumentResourcePolicy();
Assert.Null(policy.GetImageRelativePath(new Uri(policy.DocumentUri, path)));
}
/// <summary>Relative request URIs and absent requests have explicit refusal behavior.</summary>
[Fact]
public void GetImageRelativePath_RelativeAndNull_RejectsInvalidRequests()
{
var policy = new DocumentResourcePolicy();
Assert.Null(policy.GetImageRelativePath(new Uri("image.png", UriKind.Relative)));
Assert.Throws<ArgumentNullException>(() => policy.GetImageRelativePath(null!));
}
}